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COMMENT
HOME RULE IN WASHINGTON-AT THE WHIM OF
THE LEGISLATURE
ROBERT F. BRACHTENBACH
Ample introduction to the topic and philosophy of -this comment
is provided by the following quotation: "... What I cannot understand
is why the people of any city should not be permitted to govern them-
selves and experiment as they choose with plans or projects consistent
with our form of government, when such action will not affect other
cities or towns but only themselves."1
One of the most elementary rules of municipal corporations is that
the power and control of the legislature over the local unit is complete
and supreme, except as restricted by the federal or state constitution.
Washington has embraced this concept as fully as any other jurisdic-
tion. In one case we find the court quoting with approval this language
from Cooley's Constitutional Limitations: ". . . [The legislature] still
has authority to amend their charters, enlarge or diminish their powers,
extend or limit their boundaries, consolidate two or more into one,
overrule their legislative action when it is deemed unwise, impolitic,
or unjust, and even abolish them altogether in the legislative discretion,
and substitute those which are different."'
The rather obvious import of such language is that the municipal
corporation is at the complete mercy of the legislature unless it is given
protection by the federal or state constitution.
What safeguards exist under the United States Constitution? The
answer is clear and concise-nonel "A municipality is merely a de-
partment of the state, and the state may withhold, grant, or withdraw
powers and privileges as it sees fit. However great or small its sphere
of action, it remains the creature of the state, exercising and holding
powers and privileges subject to the sovereign will."3 Mr. Justice
Cardozo has said that a municipal corporation has "no privileges or
immunities under the federal constitution which it may invoke in
1 So spoke William F Devin, then Mayor of Seattle, on June 10, 1949, in an address
to the Annual Meeting of the Association of Washington Cities [quoted at page 329,
MumcaP'.IInEs AND TEE LAW IN ACTION (1950 ed.)].2 Wheeler School District No. 152 v. Hawley, 18 Wn2d 37, 137 P2d 1010 (1943).
S City of Trenton v. State of New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923).
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opposition to the will of its creator."4 However, contract rights of third
persons against the municipality are protected.
Before examining our Washington Constitution on this question, it
is appropriate to mention a theory which is sometimes urged as a
limitation apart from any express constitutional guaranty. It is the
doctrine of an inherent right to local self-government, a theory which
has met with only a very small measure of success. The proposition
appears erroneous in face of the concept that the power of a state and
its people resides in the legislature except as limited by the constitu-
tion. If the particular power in question has not in fact been denied,
how can there be any power in a body other than the legislature? The
theory is of no moment in Washington.'
Turning then to the Washington Constitution, have the cities of
this state been granted the right to control their local affairs with
freedom from legislative interference? Article XI, section 10, is the
center of our attention in answering this question. It reads (in part):
"Any city containing a population of twenty thousand inhabitants, or
more, shall be permitted to frame a charter for its own government,
consistent with and subject to the constitution and laws of this
state. .. ."
This provision was adopted by the framers of the constitution at
the convention of 1889. Apparently it engendered no great contro-
versy, though its course through the convention was somewhat hazard-
ous. It was altered from the form in which it came out of committee.
First came a successful motion to reduce from twenty-five thousand
to five thousand the minimum population requirement for a city to
adopt a charter. Then a motion to strike the entire section dealing
with power to make and amend a charter carried by a vote of forty-two
to twenty-nine. Finally, the section was reinserted with a population
requirement of twenty thousand.'
4Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36 (1933). The court
in two cases appears to recognize the doctrine, but there is an express holding that
Washington follows the majority position.
5 In Plumas v. Town of Cosmopolis, 128 Wash. 697, 223 Pac. 1052 (1924), the court
referred to an "implied inherent power of cities to protect their citizens from those
practices that threaten to destroy general welfare." It is submitted that this langauge
is materlally weakened as the very power in question was granted by statute. Ex rel
State Tax Comm. v. Redd, 166 Wash. 132, 6 P.2d 619 (1932), contains language
leaning toward recognition of an inherent right, but the real meaning of the case is
that the legislature cannot take away that which is granted by the constitution. EX rel
Clausen v. Burr, 65 Wash. 524, 118 Pac. 639 (1911), destroys any inference raised by
these cases.6 SMITH, AN ANALYTICAL INDEX OF THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1889, 108-110. Thesis submitted for degree of Master
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The success of this provision as a grant of home rule powers must
be guaged, in the main, by its interpretation by the Supreme Court of
Washington. This combination of words in the constitution obtains
meaning only when we look at the decisions to see how the clause has
operated in a particular instance. The cases are legion, and from an
early case in 1891 to the present, the rule has been clear and oft stated:
a general statute enacted by the legislature supersedes or modifies
provisions of a city charter to the extent that they are in conflict.7
Two cases, selected at random, may illustrate the operative effect
of the judicial attitude toward home rule. An early case, Benton v.
Seattle Electric Co.,' presented a conflict between a city ordinance
provision that the granting of street railway franchises must be sub-
mitted to a vote of the people and a statute which vested the power
of granting such franchises in the legislative body of the city. The
court held the ordinance requirement void as conflicting with the
statute. A recent case, Mosebar v. Moore,9 indicates that the same
attitude still prevails. That controversy involved this factual pattern:
RCW 35.21.200 provides in part "1... residence of an employee outside
the limits of such city or town shall not be grounds for discharge of
any regularly appointed civil service employee otherwise qualified."
Article 2, section 4, of the charter of the city of Yakima provides:
"Persons hereafter employed by the city shall be residents of the city
except those whose duties require them to live outside of the city."
Held: a city fireman, who was a civil servant otherwise qualified, could
not be discharged for having moved his residence beyond the corporate
limits of Yakima.
It is essential to note that neither of the above decisions, nor indeed,
any decision in Washington, attempts to analyze the particular power
or function in question to ascertain whether it concerned and affected
only a local matter or whether it was properly of state-wide concern.
This approach is a wide deviation from the usual pattern in other
jurisdictions; normally the initial inquiry is whether it is a matter of
local or state concern, the answer thereto determining whether the
charter provision stands or falls as against the statute. Thus, in Wash-
of Arts, University of Washington, 1947. As indicated on page 7 of. this thesis, the
full debates of the conventoin were taken in shorthand notes, but were never transcribed
so that a full account is not available.
7tn re Cloherty, 2 Wash. 137, 27 Pac. 1064 (1891). Mosebar v. Moore, 41 Wn.2d
216, 248 P2d 385 (1952).
a 50 Wash. 156, 96 Pac. 1033 (1908).
9 Supra note 7.
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ington, the legislature may enact measures on matters purely local in
nature, and completely override municipal action.
It is submitted that McBain was entirely realistic and accurate
when he wrote that ". . . in practice as well as in law home rule in
Washington has been and is more largely a matter of legislative grace
than of constitutional right.... The distinction between state and local
affairs has not been read into the constitution by the courts, and there-
fore no sphere of immunity from the control of state laws has been
created for the city even in respect to matters which are sometimes
regarded as of strictly local concern."'0 [Emphasis added.] In short,
every city charter in Washington has, in effect, an appendage that the
provisions thereof are subject to alteration, amendment, or destruction
at the whim of the legislature.
At this juncture the reader has likely asked why this concern with
home rule? Is it a meaningful expression or only an appealing phrase?
It is submitted that home rule has a real meaning and value and is of
vital concern to the cities of America and their inhabitants." Its broad
purpose may be stated thus: "... . to bring the agencies by which power
is to be exercised as near as possible to the subjects upon which the
power is to operate.""
More precisely, home rule is aimed at these objectives: (1) to pre-
vent unwarranted legislative interference in municipal affairs; (2) as
a corollary thereto, to permit and develop true local government and
give some freedom of choice in erecting the framework of the local
unit;' 3 and (3) to give cities adequate powers to meet the changing
needs of their citizens." The latter point cannot be over-emphasized
as being of vital concern to those cities that have experienced an influx
of population, either by annexation or migration, within the past decade
or more.
1o MCBAIi-, THE LAW AND THt PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE, 455-456
(1916).
"1 It has been termed the number one municipal problem. MUNICIPALITIES AND THE
LAW iN AcrboN, 329 (1950 ed.).
12 Proposed Constitutional Amendments-Granting Home Rule to Cities, Conference
of the Mayors of the Cities of the State of New York-Committee. LEGAL PAM,,PH-
LETS, Vol. 15 (not dated).
is "Government by remote control is seldom satisfactory government. And when
the government agency is a legislature in which the cities have but minority repre-
sentation, its evils grow like the green bay tree. Legislative interference with cities
tends to turn state legislatures into spasmodic city councils." Morr, HoME RULE FOR
AMERICA'S CITIES, 11 (1949).
14 "If cities are to be able to meet the needs of their citizens promptly, it is essential
that they be given the authority to determine those needs for themselves." MoTr, op. cit.
supra, note 13, at 12.
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Those who assert that the home rule problem is academic, and that
actual and potential legislative interference is small or non-existent
are indeed naive. For example, it would appear that the method of
appointment of members of a library board, or the method by which
a city council voted at its meetings, or the fixing of salaries of municipal
employees would all fall within an area where the city can dictate its
own policy and procedure, yet these very subjects have been held to
be beyond municipal control when the legislature so decides."
In each session the Washington legislature has shown an inclination
to legislate in the area of purely local affairs of the municipalities, but
not to the degree evidenced in some jurisdictions."0 Even if the legisla-
ture refrained from such meddling, the city is in need of more protection
for legislative forbearance, subject to the political currents of the day,
is indeed a weak foundation upon which our cities are to build their
governmental structures.
The gateway to the needed change and improvement is an amend-
ment to the constitution. The actual drafting of such an amendment
demands the work of experts and is beyond the scope of this article.
However, general suggestions seem appropriate.
It is submitted that no one state has perfected a home rule grant
that Washington should adopt in toto, but obvious utility lies in the
experience 6f other jurisdictions. Short-comings of particular language
will be revealed along with a delineation of the "trouble" areas.
A warning has been sounded to those who would frame a home rule
grant: "Throughout the history of constitutional home rule there runs
a thread of consistency-the phenomenon of continued efforts by cities
to obtain constitutional protection against legislative abuse, crowned
by apparent success in obtaining constitutional guarantee, and presently
set at naught by judicial interpretation of imprecise constitutional
language."17 Unfortunately the cases bear out this warning.
Constitutional grants of home rule are of three types: (1) the per-
missive category merely authorizes the legislature to pass statutes
15 Mansfield v. O'Brien, 271 Mass. 515, 171 N.E. 487 (1930); Adams v. City of
Omaha, 101 Neb. 690, 164 N.W. 714 (1917) ; E rel West v. Grable, 72 Fla. 61, 22
So. 460 (1916). These examples are not extreme.
16 In North Carolina a total of 528 legislative acts, during the period of 1917-1947,
directly concerned the structure of municipal governments. In that same period 369
acts related to municipal limits and extensions. These acts comprised 2.80 of the
special legislation passed in that period. Popular Government, INxsiTr u op GovRN-
MENT, UNIV. oF N. CAR., Feb.-March, 30-31 (1949).17 Richland, Constitutonal City Home Rule in New York, 54 COL. L. R. 311, at 315
(1954).
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permitting cities to govern themselves. Obviously this is of little value
for what the legislature may give it may take away. (2) Another type
grants power to the cities to adopt charters but requires enactment of
enabling legislation by the legislature. (3) A self-executing grant
enables cities to adopt charters without the necessity of enabling
legislation. The last type, of course, is most effective and desirable.
The wording of the grant of power varies from state to state, e.g.,
"may frame and adopt a charter" or "to enact and amend their munici-
pal charter," but the essential inquiry is what powers are actually
granted. Obviously "the heart of any home rule provision is the power
which it grants to the cities. Without a broad grant of authority to the
municipality, home rule is a delusion." 8
How can this best be accomplished? Should the grant be a broad
general grant (e.g., "to govern all local affairs") or should it specify
with some detail the particular powers the cities are to receive (e.g.,
"to control traffic, to regulate zoning, etc.")? At least one writer feels
that the broad general grant is preferable and that a listing of powers
is totally impractical. 9
It is suggested that neither approach, standing alone, is satisfac-
tory. The general grant may well meet the fate of such narrow con-
struction as to nearly nullify it. Such result is quite probable unless
the judicial approach has undergone a change not evidenced in the
decisions. Similarly, the specification of powers without an accompany-
ing general grant will be limited by its very statement; the court would
almost certainly refuse to expand the grant of specific powers beyond
those named. Detailed enumeration alone in the constitution leads to
an undesirable rigidity; flexibility is needed to meet tomorrow's needs.
The most effective solution seems to lie in a combination of the two
alternatives. In this manner cities are assured of autonomy in those
areas most predominately local in nature, being specifically granted
power in those areas, yet flexibility to meet changing demands is pro-
vided by the general grant. Of course, it must be specified that the
enumeration of powers is not a limitation upon the general grant.
The language of the general grant of power varies also. One clause
reads ". . . in respect to municipal affairs. . .";" another, "... . authority
to exercise all powers of local self-government .. 21 and still another,
Is MoTr, op. cit. supra, note 13, at 18.
19 Mor, supra note 13.
20 CALIF. CONST., ART. XI, §§6-8.
21 OHIO CONST., ART. XVIII, § 3.
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".... all its local and municipal affairs .... I'2 The argument is made
that if the grant is of power over "municipal affairs," it is broader than
one over "local affairs." The latter arguably implies that no powers in
which the state has any interest is included, but "municipal' may
include anything pertaining to the city although the state also has
some inetrest. The distinction has not been of much weight, but the
argument exists so the broader term should be used. .Regardless how
broad the wording of the general grant may be, it must be recognized
that its true boundaries will be laid out by judicial interpretation.
The real difficulty arises when one attempts to define or enumerate
the areas in which the cities are to enjoy freedom. Unfortunately the
determination whether a particular matter is of state-wide concern, or
only of local significAnce cannot be made the subject of a precise
formula. The best that can be done is to tabulate those areas which
appear to be of local concern only and recommend that control over
them be specifically granted to the cities.
The control of streets, traffic and parking is an ever present problem
to both local and state bodies. The interest of the municipality in
regulating speed on its streets, determining location of parking meters,
establishing streets, and regulating other uses of its streets is apparent.
On the other hand, the state desires uniformity in speed and traffic-
control measures on state highways, whether within corporate bound-
aries or not. The potential conflict should be resolved by granting the
city control over all streets within its boundaries, except as such may
be a part of the state highway system, in which case state regulations
should control. 8 The decisions are in conflict on this point. Some
jurisdictions refer to the powers of cities over streets as exclusive and
unlimited.2' Others impose a duty to maintain the streets, yet hold
that the legislature of the state has plenary power over the streets
of a city.25
At this point it seems proper to anticipate potential criticism, to wit:
that since the cities of Washington already enjoy at least some of the
powers herein discussed, why are we concerned? This attack is dis-
pelled by pointing out that the real issue is not whether they presently
enjoy a particular power, but rather whether they are assured of the
2 COLO. CONST., ART. XX, § 6.
2328 ORE. L. REv. 395, at 397 (1949).
- Foster's Inc. v. Boise City, 63 Ida. 201, 118 P.2d 721 (1941).
25 Chamberlain v. Board of Commissioners of City of Mobile, 243 Ala. 662, 11 So.2d
724 (1943).
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continuation of such power without interference. As indicated above,
there is no such assurance in Washington.
Relations between a city and its employees should be solely of local
concern." For example, how can the residents of Spokane or Seattle
have any valid concern with the working hours, pension-plan or resi-
dential requirements of the city water-department employee or city
fireman of Yakima or Tacoma? Unfortunately, the legislature has
apparently been of the opinion that there is an overriding state concern
sufficient to demolish a local charter provision. 7 City officials are
unreasonably and unnecessarily hampered in formulating and executing
policies when faced with the constant threat that certain employee
groups may exert pressure upon the legislature to enact a statute
governing the relations between the city and these employees and thus
override the local policy. Most damaging is the legislative grant of
additional monetary benefits to city employees (e.g., pension plans)
without authorizing a new or expanded source of revenue to meet the
increased burden.
The protection of public health and safety is largely of state-wide
concern. Germs and epidemics recognize no corporate limits and the
machinery to combat such elements must be state-wide."
Likewise, the protection of public morals lies within the ambit of
state control in many cases. However, there is an area of overlapping
interests. For instance, liquor regulation is properly a state function,
but does this completely preclude the city from such matters as regu-
lating closing hours of taverns? " A similar problem has arisen with
the censorship of movies."' These subjects are by no means the sole
ones in this conflict area.
It is apparent that many of these functions are in fact interwoven,
making delineation difficult; e.g., the exercise of the police power, some-
times held to be an area of state supremacy," is necessarily involved
286 "There are few matters so intimately and exclusively of municipal concern as the
mode of selecting persons for municipal employment." McGOLDPrCK, THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE, 76 (1933). See also, 9 OHIO ST. L. J. 1, at 38
(1948), containing an excellent discussion by a leading authority.
27 Mosebar v. Moore, supra note 7.
28 City of Buyrus v. Dept. of Health of Ohio, 120 Ohio St. 426, 166 N.E. 370 (1929).
29 Neil House Hotel Co., v. City of Columbus, 144 Ohio St. 248, 58 N.E.2d 665
(1944), holds an ordinance invalid which restricted sales beyond an hour earlier than
the one set by statute.
so 62 WEEK L. BUL. 225 (1917).
3' State ex rel Arey v. Sherrill, 142 Ohio St. 574, 53 N.E.2d 501 (1944). Same hold-
ing as to the fire department, State ex rel Strain v. Houston, 138 Ohio St. 203, 34
N.E.2d 219 (1941).
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in the control of parking, a local function. The Washington Constitu-
tion grants the right to exercise the police power to cities, except as
there is conflict with general laws."2
The planning anfd zoning operations of the municipality are matters
of local concern and should be solely vested in the municipality. It
has been so held."3 The character of the use of a particular area of
real estate is essentially of interest only to those adjacent to it. Simi-
larly, the specifications of a city building code should be determined
by the particular city in which it operates.
In considering any of these functions, there is little or no basis for
the potential contention that municipal officers or employees will be
less competent or thorough in making policy determinations or in
regulating a certain function. In fact, defects and abuses will be
brought to light more quickly and corrected. It is quite probable that
citizen X, dissatisfied with a certain element of city government, will
call upon the councilman in charge thereof, but would not raise his
voice if the policy or control originated in the state capitol.
The establishment and regulation of courts is strictly of state con-
cern. Washington early held that a charter city had no power to create
municipal or p6lice courts.3' The desirability of unifornifty overcomes
the lesser benefit of vesting some control in the cities as to establish-
ment and regulation.
The right and procedure of exercising eminent domain should be
controlled by the state. 3 This is not to say that the city should not
enjoy such a right, but rather that it should not be the one to lay out
the rules for exercise of the power.""
To what extent shall the cities enjoy freedom in the field of local
finance? It has been said that "in theory there is no more appropriate
field for complete home rule than the domain of local finances.137 If
the municipality is to meet the demands for present and increased
services, it must have an adequate source of revenue. "A municipality
32ARr. XI, § 11 "Any county, city, town or township may make and enforce within
its limits all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with
general laws." See Sandona v. City of Cle Elum, 37 Wn.2d 831, 226 P.2d 889' (1951).
For a peculiar interpretation of this provision, see Brown v. Cle Elum, 145 Wash. 588,
261 Pac. 112 (1927).33 Carnabuci v. City of Norwalk, 70 Ohio App. 429, 46 N.E.2d 773 (1942).
3' Its re Cloherty, 2 Wash. 137, 27 Pac. 1064 (1891).
35 Nagle v. City of Grand Island, 144 Neb. 67, 12 N.W.2d 540 (1943).
86 City of Tacoma v. State, 4 Wash. 64, 29 Pac. 847 (1892).
7 UMcGOLDRICK, .stpra note 26, at 340. The author states further: "In theory also,
there is no fitter topic for uniform legislation than municipal finance, but in practice
general legislation is a delusion and a snare."
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without the power of taxation would be a body without life, incapable
of acting and serving no useful purpose, 38 said the United States
Supreme Court.
There is much conflict in this area, there being no general concensus
nation-wide. While a municipal corporation has no inherent power of
taxation," some courts have held that a home rule charter may be the
basis of authority for taxation."0 California has taken a liberal stand,
holding that the power of a home rule city to impose taxes for revenue
purposes is strictly a municipal affair."
Regardless what power of taxation be vested in the cities,"2 it is
most common that they be subject to tax and debt limitations, Wash-
ington being in accord.'
In the area of special assessments, when faced with the question
whether the power to control such a function is lodged solely in the
municipality, Washington has held a state law supreme." Our neigh-
bor, Oregon, has viewed the power to levy a special assessment as one
"concededly municipal in character and intramural in scope. .. ."
Likewise, Oklahoma considers such assessments as a municipal affair
and charter provisions relating thereto supersede conflicting statutes."
The above discussion should illustrate that the area of finance pre-
sents a complex problem when drafting a home rule grant. The cities
need expanded sources of revenue, yet the state obviously has a valid
interest in the financial condition of its component parts. Fordham
has summarized the heart of the problem: "There can be much genuine
38 United States v. City of New Orleans, 98 U.S. 225 (1879).
39 McGoLDRiCK, supra note 26, at 340.
40 Park v. City of Duluth, 134 Minn. 296, 159 N.W. 627 (1916).
41 Ainsworth v. Bryant, 34 Cal.2d 465, 211 P.2d 564 (1949); West Coast Adver-
tising Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 14 Cal.2d 516, 95 P2d 138 (1939).
See also, City of Portland v. Welch, 154 Ore. 286, 59 P.2d 228 (1936), wherein the
court saw the problem in this manner: "If a city has not violated any constitutional or
statutory limitation of indebtedness or taxation, of what concern is it to the people
of the state at large whether it levies a tax to pay its city officials, repair fire hose,
build a swimming pool, buy stamps, or improve a public park? Are these not matters
of purely local concern? If such items of expenditure can be eliminated or reduced, in
accordance with the judgment of members of a nonelective commission, then the right
of local self-government under the Home Rule Amendments of the Constitution has
become a hollow mockery." Cf. the situation in Ohio, Haefner v. City of Youngstown,
147 Ohio St. 58, 68 N.E.2d 64 (1946).
42 WASH. CONsT., ART. 7, § 9, "For all corporate purposes, all municipal corpora-
tions may be vested with authority to assess and collect taxes ......
48 ART. 8, § 6 and AMENDExNT 17.
44 Van Der Creek v. Spokane, 78 Wash. 94, 138 Pac. 560 (1914).
45 Wilson v. City of Medford, 107 Ore. 624, 215 Pac. 184 (1923).
4 Berry v. McCormick, 91 Okla. 211, 217 Pac. 392 (1923).
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local discretion without the courts embracing the notion that both local
borrowing power and procedure are strictly local business."' 7
Although there is a division of authority, it is the general holding
that a city cannot make its own determination of the method of an-
nexing territory, but must proceed under general law.'8
Another facet of the home rule clause deserving consideration relates.
to the population requirement which a city must meet before it is
entitled to frame its charter. The minimum in Washington is presently
twenty thousand inhabitants. This is somewhat greater than the re-
quirement in many states.'9 It is suggested that consideration be given
to lowering the minimum in Washington, possibly to ten thousand, but
it seems unwise to extend it to cities below ten thousand in population.
Such municipalities are provided with a relatively workable scheme
of government by statute. Especially in the smaller cities, the officials
are often low-salaried and part-time only, hence such cities lack the
expert guidance of full-time officials needed in an autonomous home
rule city.
The present method of charter making and amendment in Washing-
ton is generally satisfactory. 0 In essence it provides that fifteen elected
freeholders prepare the charter which is then submitted to the voters.
If a majority voting thereon ratify it, it becomes the charter of said
city. It may be amended by proposals submitted by the legislative
authority of the city to the electors. In contrast, California requires
that the charter be submitted to the state legislature; that body having
a veto power only, it can approve or reject but not modify.
The preceding pages indicate in a small measure the range and extent
of the problems and considerations which must be dealt with in draft-
ing and interpreting a home rule clause. The discussion is by no means
exhaustive.
In conclusion, it is submitted that this discussion demonstrates the
inadequacy of Washington's present constitutional home rule provision.
The writer earnestly urges the adoption of a constitutional amendment
which will enable cities to function without state legislative interference
in those areas which are strictly local or municipal in character.
' FoRD3A, LOCAL GOVkiNMqT LAw, 102 (1949).
48 State eX rel Snell v. Warner, 4 Wash. 773, 31 Pac. 25 (1892). McGOLDRICK,
.rupra, note 26, at 328-329, but see City of Fort Worth v. State ex rel Ridglea Village,
186 S.W.2d 323 (1945).
49 E.g., Am. CoNST., ART. XIII, § 2, 3,500; CoLO. Co NsT., ART. XX, § 6, 2,000;
OKLA. CONST., ART. XVIII, § 3 (a), 2,000.
SO ART. XI, § 10.
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